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Risk management experiences of the Korean Seoul-Pusan high-speed railway (KTX) project since the planning stage are evaluated. One can
clearly see the interplay of engineering and construction risks, financial risks and political risks in the development of the KTX project, which is the
peculiarity of large-scale new railway system projects. A brief description on evaluation methodology and overview of the project is followed by de-
tailed evaluations on key differences in risks between conventional railway system and high-speed railway system, social and political risks, engineer-
ing and construction risks, and financial risks. Risks involved in system procurement process, such as proposal solicitation, evaluation, selection, and
scope of solicitation are separated out and evaluated in depth. Detailed events resulting from these issues are discussed along with their possible
impact on system risk. Lessons learned and further possible refinements are also discussed.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The Korean high-speed railway that connects Seoul
and Pusan, KTX (Korea Train Express), started its test
run on the 57-kilometer-long test track beginning Decem-
ber 1, 1999 (Figure 1). It is a French TGV-based system
(Figure 2), and runs on 412 km long line with four inter-
mediate stations. It will start its first-stage commercial
operation in 2004 using a new line and some segments
of the existing line and the second-stage revenue opera-
tion from the year 2010 on a completely new line. It
might be premature to fully analyze risks of the new KTX
system, but after eight years of construction and addi-
tional years of planning process, it provides enough ma-
terial and interesting insights on the risk aspects of the
project. It is hoped that these valuable experiences will
shed lights on similar new large-scale railway projects.
One fleet consists of 20 coaches and will be able
to accommodate about 900 persons when it is completed
and put in operation in 2004. Careful planning, construc-
tion and operation schemes are essential to keep the rail-
way system safe and reliable, considering the large
number of passengers on board. The KTX has charac-
teristics that make the project more complex than exist-
ing railway projects. It utilizes non-indigenous
technology, and therefore foreign system technology
should be selected following due process, which put an
extra burden on project scheduling and cost control. Be-
cause it is a new line construction, combinations of align-
ment design criteria, system technologies, and station
location and the route have to be decided concurrently.
This calls for much more complex decision processes in-
volving local governments in addition to the central gov-
ernment. Furthermore, it involves high uncertainties in terms
of political risks, in addition to financial and technological
aspects. This stems from the long project duration that spans
many government administrations and the large project size
that encompasses different administrative bodies. Therefore
the project called for extensive risk management for suc-
cessful and safe completion that is much more complex than
any other project ever carried out in Korea. To tackle these
difficult tasks, the organization in charge of the project com-
pleted risk management efforts, with varying degrees of suc-
cess, at different stages of the project from the inception to
now. Also the task should continue until the successful com-
missioning and daily operation.
This paper evaluates risk management experiences of
the Korean Seoul-Pusan KTX project so far since the in-
ception of the project. The next section discusses and de-
fines risk as was used in the paper, followed by the
description of historical development of the project. Cat-
egorized risk items are discussed based on the KTX expe-
riences, and finally the lessons learned are summarized.
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2. RISK ANALYSIS OF NEW RAILWAY
SYSTEM PROJECTS
In the context of this paper, risk is defined as the
potential for the completed new railway system project
being unable to function as intended at the project con-
ception, resulting from uncertainty about the project. It
can represent anything from cost overrun, project delay,
safe construction and operation, and system integrity. In
that sense, it is much broader than financial or safety
risks usually considered for projects. Risk assessment and
management are difficult and important in large railway
projects. It is more so in a railway project with a new
system technology. There are, however, not much exist-
ing literature dealing with risk management in new high-
speed railway system projects, even though there are
numerous sources of information for general construc-
tion and transport projects.
Risk management on construction projects have re-
ceived much attention and there are much literature, for ex-
ample, see Flangagan and Norman1, Lifson and Shaifer2,
and Skipp3. Among these, Skipp3 concentrates on more
detailed topics of ground engineering, and the rest dis-
cusses risk management of general construction projects.
Taylor4 discusses risk analysis for pipelines and transport,
but it concentrates on ship collision issues. Blockley5
deals with engineering safety issues extensively. Rhyne’s6
work has more direct relevance to this paper, but relies
heavily on the existing operation records for risk assess-
ment, which is not possible with new railway system
projects. Risk issues are also addressed from the perspec-
tive of system reliability, for example, see Colombo and
Bustamante7 and Henley and Kumamoto8. Smith9, for
example, discusses the economic side of risk assessment.
Suh and Kwon10 present local application experiences for
highway project economic analysis. The Institute for Ur-
ban Transportation11, Booze-Allen12, and Abacus Tech-
nology13 all address transit risk management. For more
direct relevance to this paper, the seminal work of Touran
et al.14 extensively discusses risk assessment in fixed
guideway transit system construction. It, however, mainly
focuses on urban transit systems, rather than new regional
railway systems projects.
Risks involved in the KTX project can be grouped
as technical, financial, social and political in nature. The
technical risks include engineering and construction
risks, and depend on the technical complexity of the
project, which is much higher than those related to con-
ventional railway projects. The financial risk is mainly
for cost overrun, and securing funding. Finally, the po-
litical risks include the political decision-making process,
public perceptions on safety and the project as a whole,
and other planning issues such as route and station se-
lection. For the KTX project, all these three risks had a
complicating interplay, and usually defied separate analy-
Fig. 2  Rolling stock of KTX
Fig. 1 Route map of Seoul-Pusan High Speed Railway
Line (KTX)
Seoul-Pusan High Speed Railway
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sis. As will be demonstrated later, it is this interplay that
can contribute greatly to cost overrun and project delay.
Touran et al. 14 identified fifteen risk items for transit
projects and grouped those into three broad categories
of design, construction and financial risks. They did not
explicitly consider social and political risks in their work.
For this paper, risks are categorized as shown in the
Table 1, explicitly defining social and political risks. The
last two columns of the table compare size of risks in-
volved in conventional railway projects with those of the
KTX project.
As shown in Table 1, some factors have more pro-
found impacts on KTX than on conventional railway
projects. For example, technology transfer is a major con-
cern for the KTX project, but it is not much of concern
for conventional railway projects that utilize already lo-
calized technologies. Also system procurement proce-
dures do not pose too much of a challenge for
conventional railway projects, but it is a major hurdle to
overcome in the KTX project. Risks for finances and du-
ration of the project are usually analyzed with some kind
of probabilistic tool, such as the Monte Carlo simulation.
Risk Group
Social and Political
Engineering/
Construction
Financial
Table 1  Risk categorization for KTX project
1st Tier
Regulatory-Licenses and
Permits
Technology Transfer
Project Feasibility
Planning
Public Perception on Safety
Decision Making Process
Design
Construction/Infrastructure
Procurement
System Procurement
Funding
Joint Venture
Cost Overrun
Delay Cost
2nd Tier
Environmental Impact Statement
Transportation Impact Statement
Energy Use Assessment
Long-term Viability
Political Situation
Reasonableness of Projects
Scope, Schedule, Cost
Technical Constraints
Complexity of Project
Standards/Code
Complexity
Completeness of Design
System Integration
Safety Standard
Quality Control
Type of Contract
Contracting Arrangement
Labor
Specification
Scope of Procurement
Procedure of Procurement
Funding Source
Inflation
Accuracy of Cost Estimate
Exchange Rate
Risks involved with
KTX Conventional rail
High Medium
High Medium
High Medium
High NA
High Medium
High Medium
High Medium
High NA
High Medium
Higher High
High Medium
High Low
High Medium
High Medium
High Low
High High
High Medium
Medium Medium
Medium Medium
Medium Medium
High Low
High Low
High Low
High Medium
Medium Medium
High Low
High Low
Medium Medium
High Medium
High Medium
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This can be done, for conventional railway project, us-
ing existing database of cost and duration. But for the
KTX project, it is very difficult to do the same, because
there are no reliable historical data.
3. MAJOR MILESTONES OF THE KTX
PROJECT
To understand the arguments of this paper, it is
helpful to have some background information on the
Seoul-Pusan high-speed railway project. Therefore,
project milestones are presented first with their histori-
cal backdrop. The web site operated by the Korea High
Speed Railway Construction Authority* will be very valu-
able in understanding the current status of the project.
3.1 From conceptual planning to groundbreaking
General Background: A general description of
high-speed railway in Korea’s national development can
be found in Suh15. In 1984, feasibility for the construc-
tion of a high-speed railway system was studied as one
measure of expanding the transportation capacity of the
Seoul-Pusan corridor. A subsequent study was initiated
in 1989 and lasted until January of 1991 to develop pre-
liminary engineering plans. In the study, engineers from
high-speed railway operating countries were excluded in
the study process to make the system selection process
more ‘objective’**. Alignment and station location alter-
natives were identified and analyzed. Drafts of request
for a proposal (RFP) for the system procurement were de-
veloped for various scenarios. Feasibility of the high-
speed railway system was re-evaluated in the second
phase study along with the national high-speed railway
network16. The study recommended a 409 km*** long
alignment with four intermediate stations and a maximum
operation speed of 300 km/h. A systematic approach em-
ployed in the study to analyze various combined alterna-
tives routes, traffic and railway system was introduced17.
Total project cost was estimated to be 5.8 trillion won****,
of which 4.6 trillion was for infrastructure, and 1.2 tril-
lion won for rolling stock.
Organization: A Special Committee* headed by the
prime minister was formed to deal with various policy
measures regarding the high-speed railway project and the
Incheon International Airport project in July 1989. In
March of 1992, the Korea High-Speed Railway Construc-
tion Authority (KHRC) was instituted with about 400
people as a field agency for high-speed railway construc-
tion. Figure 3 shows the organizational chart of the
KHRC as of 1999.
Construction: A groundbreaking ceremony for the
test-track segment of 57 km connecting Chunan and
Daejeon was held in June 30, 1992. It was only one year
after the start of the detailed design, and eight months after
issuing the RFP, for which the proposal was received in
January 1992. The system was not decided yet; therefore,
the strategy taken was to proceed with alignment design
utilizing design variables that could be common denomi-
nators of the three high-speed railway systems being con-
sidered**. Table 2 shows major design criteria of the system.
3.2 First amendment of the master plan (1993)
One year after the groundbreaking ceremony, the
master plan for the high-speed railway was greatly modi-
fied in June 1993. Important items of notice were:
- Cost of the project increased to 10.74 trillion won
(1993 price) from 5.8 trillion won (1988 price).
* http://www.khrc.or.kr/
** This was one of the vital decisions made by the Korean government
that has had long-lasting impact on the project progress.
*** This was the original route, and extended later in piecemeal fashion
to 426 km and changed back to 412 km.
**** 800 won = $US 1 in 1989, now exchange rate is about 1,200 won =
$US 1.
Table 2  Major design criteria
Description Design Criteria
Maximum Operating Speed 300 km/h
Design Speed 350 km/h
Standard Radius 7,000 m
Track Centerline Spacing 5.0 m
Maximum Grade 15 ‰
Standard Design Load LS-22
Tunnel Cross Section 107 m2
Total Line Length 411 km
Earthwork 119.59 km (29%)
Bridge 152.73 km (37%)
Tunnel 138.68 km (34%)
Grade by Percent 100%
Less than 5 ‰ 191.74 km (47%)
5 to 10‰ 96.06 km (23%)
10 to 15‰ 123.20 km (30%)
* Steering Committee of the High Speed Railway and the Incheon
International Airport Construction
** This was also a very important decision that had a profound impact
on the system configuration and construction.
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- An additional station at the outskirts of Seoul was
added (South-Seoul station): total number of stations
became five.
- The commissioning date was postponed from 1998 to
2001* (First Phase with shared ROW with conventional
railway between South-Seoul and Seoul main station)
- Second Phase with the new dedicated segment between
South-Seoul and Seoul station will be opened in 2010.
- All intermediate stations will be built at street level in-
stead of underground.
More than 80% of the cost increase was attributed
to price increases for the past three years. The remaining
20% was loosely attributed to a 13 km increase in align-
ment length and building requirements. The length of the
line increased from 409 km to 421.7 km. The cost in-
crease not only accounts for price increases during the
past four years, but also includes additional changes re-
sulting from the design variables. Design speed, tunnel
cross section, and route length are only some examples.
Therefore it is not wise to directly compare those two fig-
ures. However, many experts believe that the initial cost
and opening year estimates were too optimistic while con-
sidering ideal conditions, and that the new cost estimate
was based on too aggressive design concepts.
Regarding rolling stock, the TGV consortium was
selected as a priority negotiation partner in August 1993,
and after almost one year, the contract for rolling stock
procurement was signed in June 1994. Figure 4 shows
the organization of the TGV consortium.
3.3 Second amendment of the master plan (1998)
In the revised master plan announced in 1998, a
phased construction and commissioning scheme was uti-
lized. For the first phase, the total line length will be
409.8 km. The new line being 222.1 km long and the im-
proved existing KNR line being 187.7 km long. Even
though the maximum speed is 300 km/h, the average
speed will be about 150 km/h. Once the second phase is
completed, the total line length will be 412 km and travel
time is expected to be 116 minutes with an average speed
of 213 km/h. For the completed alignment, 111 km will
be at-grade comprising 27%, 112 km will be viaduct,
comprising 27%, and 189 km will be tunnels compris-
ing 46%. A total of 46 train sets are expected to operate
on the line. About 74% of the rolling stock will be manu-
factured locally.
The project cost was announced to be 18,435.8 bil-
lion won, and for the first phase, 12,737.7 billion won at
the 1998 price. Of the total cost, the central government
will be responsible for 45%, of which 35% is equity par-
ticipation and 10% is a loan to KHRC. The remaining
55% will be financed by KHRC. 29% will be by bond,
24% by foreign loans in the format of supplier’s credit,
and 2% by private capital. Table 3 shows the funding
scheme for the project.
* Total construction period was regarded to be seven years.
Source: Korea High Speed Railway Construction Authority, 1999
Fig. 3  Organization chart of the Korea High Speed Railway Construction Authority
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General Service Division Finance Division Construction Division RS & Elec.Fac.Division
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4. MAJOR RISK MANAGEMENT ISSUES
Two amendments to the master plan, as explained
before, of KTX themselves represent major risk manage-
ment efforts. More interesting lessons, however, can be
obtained by looking into individual risk items. As was
discussed previously, there will be many different ways
to categorize risks, and some subjectivity will certainly
play a part in the process. They are confined to a small
number of important categories as shown in Table 1, and
an effort is made to explain most of the issues within them.
Specific risk items that might be of general interest, not
country specific, are chosen for wider audiences.
4.1 Social and political risks
4.1.1 Regulatory risks
Regulatory risks represent all the uncertainties in
obtaining licenses and permits in time. They include En-
vironmental Impact Statement (EIS), Transportation Im-
pact Statement, Site Impact Analysis, and Energy Use
Certificate for Korean case. Noise, vibration and dust from
the KTX posed special problems in the course of EIS
stage. Adverse effects of KTX right-of-way that divides
existing villages also caused stiff opposition from local
people, and required building extra pathways. As can be
seen in the route near Kyungju, the route passing through
the archaeological site posed a special challenge to the
project. The Ministry of Culture (MOC) usually has dif-
ferent priorities concerning building transport infrastruc-
ture and conserving historical sites.
4.1.2 Technology transfer
From the outset of the project, the second impor-
tant objective of the KTX project was identified to be
providing impetus in advancing local railway systems
Table 3 Funding scheme for the Phase 1 Seoul-Pusan
High Speed Railway
(In constant value as of Jan. 1, 1998 , Unit: Billion won)
Classification Original Revised Amount
Plan(6.14.93) Plan(7.31.98) Changed
Amount % Amount %
Gov't Contribution 4,833 45 5,732 45 899
Subsidy 3,759 35 4,458 35 699
Loan 1,759 10 1,274 10 200
Financing by KHRC 5,907 55 7,005 55 1,098
Local Currency 3,331 31 3,668 29 337Bonds
Offshore Financing 1,978 18 3,075 24 1,097
Private Capital 598 6 262 2 (336)
Total 10,740 100 12,737 100 1,997
The chart shows a detailed comparison of the revised and original funding
plan of Phase I: funding scheme for Phase 2 will be the same
Source: Korea High Speed Rail Construction Authority, 1999
Source: Korea High Speed Railway Construction Authority, 1999
Fig. 4  Organization of Korea TGV consortium
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technology. Therefore, technology transfer schemes have
received high priority in the project development. The
Ministry of Science and Technology and the Ministry of
Industry and Resources played a big role in developing
technology transfer schemes. Also their objectives usu-
ally do not coincide with those of the Ministry of Con-
struction and Transportation (MOCT).
Development of the detailed technology transfer
scheme put extra strain on the project budget and dura-
tion. Design technology received less emphasis than roll-
ing stock technology, but later experiences demonstrated
that system integration technology was very important
technology to be transferred, and infrastructure design
technology, with which local engineers felt comfortable,
was also important.
4.1.3 Project feasibility
One should be prepared to deal with political in-
fluences when working with such a large project that en-
compasses 70 percent of the national population. It is
generally understood that route and station selection will
be influenced somehow. The timing of certain important
mi le s tones  wi l l  be  in f luenced ,  such  as  the
groundbreaking and opening, etc. Usually, the impact of
the influences is hard to evaluate as being positive or
negative. It is a matter of “value” which engineers and
planners do not have at their disposal.
With the Seoul-Pusan high-speed railway project,
many issues influenced by political interest were out-
standing. The top-level decision maker is the president,
of course. Since the start of the construction, three presi-
dents have dealt with the project. Their tenure is five
years. The timing choice of RFP issuance and
groundbreaking seemed to have a clear political impli-
cation of the then-outgoing president. Even though the
new government actually signed the legislation in 1994,
the previous government already arranged the fundamen-
tal policy. This critical political decision put many en-
gineers, planners, and government officials in agony. The
decision impacted the system procurement decision and
selection of design variables.
The choice of the route passing Kyungju was not
solely based on economic efficiency after all. After much
debate, trouble, and recent changes on the alignment
passing Kyungju, that route will not be realized until the
year 2010. The route that will be used for the time be-
ing was the route advocated over the Kyungju route by
many engineers and planners during the initial study. One
can only hope that the decision makers must have had
better insights for the “value” of society.
4.1.4 Planning
With the system selection, changes in route, align-
ment and cost, and the revised master plan, the system
configuration in 1993 became much different from the
original system configuration of 1989. Even after 1993,
many incremental and piecemeal changes happened con-
tinuously to the system. The original travel time of 90
minutes for the express service became 160 minutes as
of 1999. Will the demand remain the same with the in-
creased travel time? How about financial viability when
the cost is more than doubled? Fares need to be increased
to maintain financial viability, but increased fares will re-
duce the demand according to the demand’s price-elastic-
ity. If the high-speed railway system is going to share the
right-of-way with the existing railway, what will happen to
the much touted expected capacity expansion? What will
be the impact of the recent economic crisis on the demand
and economic and financial viability? Ongoing checks about
these issues will clearly be a planning function.
4.1.5 Public perception on safety
The stellar safety record of Japanese and French
high-speed railway systems was much advanced as one
of the supporting arguments for the KTX project from the
outset. Possibly out of this trust, high public perception
on safety also played a critical role in project progress,
usually in a negative way. The route on the Sangri tun-
nel was re-routed to detour nearby old mines, despite ad-
vice from experts against the detour. The detour added
at least three extra years to the project duration. The pub-
lic has different views on risks than engineer. Engineer
has better information, and knows risk more objectively.
But public and political bodies have more simplistic view
on risks, and it is very difficult to control. When there is
some incident in the construction site, media hype and
public perception usually prevailed over engineering
judgment, and added extra unnecessary burden on the
project cost and duration. This was especially true with
the case when the media reported some problems with
the already constructed structures at the end of 1996. It
almost stopped the project for more than one year. After
that incident, foreign supervision teams were mobilized
in a much broader scale.
4.1.6 Decision making process
The organizational chart of the KHRC is shown in
Figure 3. The division of labor of government agencies
regarding high-speed railway is as follows: KHRC is in
charge of construction; Korean National Railway (KNR),
operation; and MOCT, overall coordination and policy-
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making. More important organizational issues stem from
the structure and responsibility of KHRC and the rela-
tionship of KHRC with MOCT. The other issue is the ef-
fectiveness of the Special Committee as the final decision
making body regarding the high-speed railway project.
It can be said that the agency that decides on important
issues should have an appropriate responsibility too. If
possible, when multiple agencies will be involved, each
agency’s responsibilities should be clearly defined at the
start of the project.
Depending on the country, a committee has different
powers of authority. Looking back at past experiences, one
might argue about the authority of the Special Commit-
tee of the Seoul-Pusan high-speed railway project. The Spe-
cial Committee has twenty-five members including all the
government ministers whose job function has any connec-
tion with the high-speed railway project. The committee
is the final decision-making body regarding the high-
speed railway and Incheon Airport project. The commit-
tee approved a route plan that includes the original
Kyungju route in 1990, and reconfirmed it in 1993. But,
in 1995, the Ministry of Culture, whose minister is a mem-
ber of the committee, asked to relocate the Kyungju route
for historic site preservation reasons. The Kyungju route
eventually was relocated in January 1997. There has been
no newly discovered historic artifacts or sites from 1993
to 1995. Apparently it will be the desire of everyone in-
volved in the project to have a solid decision making body
that has the final say.
4.1.7 Central-local government cooperation
At the time of writing this paper, the location and
development method of the new main station in Seoul is
still not officially decided. MOCT prefers the existing
Seoul station, while Seoul city government likes to use
the high-speed railway as leverage to develop the area
around Yongsan station, which Seoul city advocates for
the main station. This factor contributed to delays in the
project’s progress. The issue of station location and ap-
proach methods was common to all the city governments
involved. Their requirements are all the same – build an
underground approach and station. These problems could
have been solved fairly easily by developing cost share
principles and adhering to them, but what actually hap-
pened was indecision because of political concerns. For
example, changes in station type of Daegu and Daejeon
were first underground, then above ground, finally be-
coming underground again in 1989, 1993, and 1995 re-
spectively. The first decision to have underground stations
was based on the city government’s influence. Those
changes were hardly based on engineering judgment. The
cost sharing scheme and service contract concept could
have solved the problem more easily.
4.2 Engineering and construction risks
4.2.1 Design
Standard and Code: Design and construction codes
are very important in railway system development. It is
especially so in a new line with new system technology.
Scope, content and structure of codes are very important.
Existing design codes and construction specifications
can be upgraded or are to be developed from scratch.
Blockley5 discusses many aspects of developing codes
with respect to engineering safety.
Korean code regarding high-speed railway was de-
veloped before specific system technology was selected.
If one accepts the fact that the code does specify ‘mini-
mum’, the code based on the common denominator of Ja-
pan, France, and Germany should not pose special
problems. As shown in Table 2, the design parameters
of KTX demonstrate this conservative approach. The
major philosophies in developing design variables were:
- Diesel locomotive should be able to run on the new line;
- Provide room for speed improvement;
- Can accommodate rolling stocks of Japan, France, and
Germany.
But one has to consider what is the price of being
conservative. This has been one of the hot issues argued
from the start of the project.
Complexity and System Integration: To carry out a
large-scale railway project that uses non-indigenous tech-
nology, one usually employs outside help. The question
to ask is the scope and timing of outside assistance. With
the Seoul-Pusan high-speed railway project, American en-
gineers were mainly utilized in the initial phase of the
project. Engineers from the three countries that have high-
speed railways were intentionally excluded at the initial
stage. It is very difficult to decide the pros and cons of
each approach, but it is good to have someone who can
give a more “objective” opinion. Also, once the system is
selected, engineers from the system provider should partici-
pate in the project.
4.2.2 Construction and infrastructure procurement
When the system procurement strategy was consid-
ered, the infrastructure procurement strategy was also
considered concurrently. One can use turnkey procure-
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ment over conventional procurement approach. The risk
involved in turn key projects is well summarized in the
Booz-Allen12. The Korean government took a conven-
tional approach over turnkey, and willingly took more
risk in favor of more project control.
The Program Manager body was proposed at the
initial study phase, but was not accepted. Program Man-
ager was recommended as one means to reduce risks in-
volved in the project development. Experts from countries
with high-speed railway operations, and other countries
were recommended to fill the positions along with local
experts. In the second amendment of 1998, one can see
the budget allocated for the Program Manager.
4.2.3 Systems procurement procedure and timing
If one had to choose the most important cause of
all the problems, the system procurement method and its
timing is it. This is the precursor to all subsequent issues.
This is the oldest cause and has the most far-reaching im-
pact. One way or another all other issues have some rel-
evance to this factor.
The most fundamental paradigm in railway system
planning is that one has to consider alternatives that are
combination of system technology, route and transporta-
tion demands. This is because these factors have some-
thing to do with the remaining factors. For example,
systems technology decides the operating speed, design
variables and capacity of the technology. These in turn
impact cost, route, and transportation demands. Also, the
route has a far-reaching impact on station-to-station travel
time, and this will impact transportation demand. There-
fore it would not be wise to separate the aforementioned
three factors. But as explained earlier, the system for the
Seoul-Pusan high-speed railway was officially selected
in 1994, which was two years after construction began
in 1992. It would not be fair to say that the engineers who
participated in the technical study of 1989 and drafted the
RFP did not know the consequences of this. They had
suffered from the should-have-been-avoided burden of
doing extra work on the preliminary engineering study
for all three target-systems.
What is included in the system procurement pack-
age is also very important. With the Seoul-Pusan high-
speed railway project, it should be understood that the
“mix-and-match” concept was attempted, apparently,
without much success. So called “high-tech” railway sys-
tems, whether they may be automated guided transit
(AGT) or high-speed railway, are known for being diffi-
cult to understand by people other than engineers and the
system suppliers. One can see that a certain system sup-
plier can have a monopoly where the system they are sup-
plying is concerned. For example, it is becoming very
difficult for one to bring a control system from one sys-
tem and use it in another system. Usually the “mix-and-
match” scheme does not apply itself well to these high-
tech systems. In the RFP, system providers were asked
to submit proposals on rolling stock, automatic train con-
trol, catenary, with some degree of interface engineering.
The KHRC called those systems the “Core” system. It
was the wishful thinking at that time that with some mi-
nor help with the interface assurance, local engineers
could handle the infrastructure. There had been very se-
rious and long debates on the pros and cons about the
procurement method. The idea of procuring partial sys-
tems finally prevailed. Eventually designs done before
the system selection underwent reviews by TGV engi-
neers. In short, the “mix-and-match” attempt for the high-
tech railway system has high risks and is not for the
faint-hearted. Total system procurement approach is the
path to take, with the option of selectively choosing the
final components for actual purchase. One has to decide
what should be purchased after first seeing what is in-
volved in the system.
4.3 Financial risks
Financial risk analysis for transit project received
much interests. Turan et al.14, Abacus Technology13, and
the Institute for Urban Transportation11, for example, dis-
cussed financial risks involved in transit projects. As was
stated before, these risk analyses are based heavily on
probabilistic approaches, which usually were not an
available option for the new KTX project. At the initial
planning stage, sensitivity analysis was carried out for
key variables.
4.3.1 Funding scheme
Securing sound funds for the project is very impor-
tant. The funding scheme itself has a bearing on the
project’s progress. At the initial planning, the possibility
of employing Build-Operate-Transfer scheme was stud-
ied, but discarded because it was decided to have too
much inherent risks. The availability of adequate capital and
at an appropriate time is critical for project implementation.
Accuracy of cost estimates is a very important is-
sue, but in retrospect the initial costs estimates, which
were based on the average of published cost of Japan,
France, and Germany, did not give satisfactory estimates.
The cost of rolling stock was off by about 60 million won.
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Table 4 shows changes in unit cost between 1993 and
1998 cost estimates. Inflation contributed to about 15 per-
cent of the total cost increase.
4.3.2 Joint venture/development
As can be seen in the Table 3, the percentage of
private funds reduced from 6 percent to 2 percent.
Amount of money that can be mobilized with a joint ven-
ture is heavily dependent on the general economic situ-
ation. Considering the recent economic crisis Korea has
experienced, it should be understood as one of the
KHRC’s efforts to reduce funding risk. Risks involved
with joint ventures are basically the risks of the economic
situation.
4.3.3 Cost overrun
Cost overrun can also be categorized as an engi-
neering/construction risk. Average costs of the KTX project
component showed a wide discrepancy between estimated
and actual figures. Also input cost increases over the years
explained much of the portion of cost overrun experienced.
For example, during the 1989 to 1993 year period, labor
cost increased about three-fold, and material costs, ready-
mix concrete for example, increased by 40 percent. During
the same period, GNP inflator for the construction sector
rose about 90 percent. This increase in unit cost accounted
for about 82 percent of the cost increase in 1993 amend-
ment. The remaining 18 percent was attributed to the change
order resulting from the route length increase.
4.3.4 Delay cost
Delay cost also can be discussed under engineer-
ing/construction risk. The original commissioning date of
1998 was delayed to 2002, and now 2004 is set for the
first-stage operation. Various factors contributed to this
delay. According to KOTI18, system selection, relocation
of the route around Sangri tunnel, re-routing of Kyungju
segment, station location and ground/underground issues
in Seoul, Daegu, and Daejeon, location of train depot
were identified as the major causes of delay. They de-
layed the project for almost four years. The delay caused
cost increases in addition to social opportunity costs. Di-
rect project cost increase caused by project delay is about
25.5 percent of the total cost overrun experienced be-
tween 1993 and 1997. One can see objectively, how much
project delay has a damaging effect on project cost control.
5. LESSONS LEARNED
The KTX project development was reviewed. Ma-
jor risk factors were evaluated based on the experiences
from the initial planning stage to the test run stage. Until
the commissioning in 2004, there should be continued ef-
forts of risk management to ensure safe and reliable high-
speed railway. The complexity of the project does not
permit an easy understanding of all the risks involved,
but at least some of the salient factors could be evaluated.
Some of the lessons learned by evaluating the risk manage-
ment efforts for the KTX project are summarized below.
A new railway system project is very complex, and
every effort should be exercised not to complicate it by
adding more project goals. Technology transfer, regional
development and other secondary objectives should re-
main as secondary. If the project goal is not concrete and
simple, many different decision bodies approach the
project with different and often conflicting goals. This is
very harmful to the cost and duration control for the
project. It is also very important to have realistic scope,
schedule and cost estimates. Sometimes, as shown in the
KTX project, project development can be seriously dis-
torted by efforts to make up for the delay caused by ex-
ternal reasons, such as delay in system procurement. Also
technology transfer should be focused on system integra-
tion, rather than rolling stock only. There are many sys-
tem specific technologies to be transferred for successful
implementation. Those technologies are not always avail-
able publicly. Inviting experts from the country that has
Table 4  Unit cost change
       (Unit: million won/km)
1993 1998 PercentageChange
Land (1000 m2) 52 49 94.5
Roadbed 12,640 18,827 148.9
Track 570 859 150.5
Building (1000 m2) 1,165 1,605 137.7
R/S (Fleet) 26,400 43,821 165.9
Depot (1000 m2) 304 265 87.0
Electrification 1,693 2,299 135.8
Communication 981 1,201 122.0
Signaling 915 902 98.5
Design 322 619 192.3
Supervision 127 1,019 803.0
Miscellaneous 291 105 35.9
Program Manager 157 598 380.2
Research 224 165 73.5
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operation experience, with responsible charges from the
initial stage of the work, may contribute to reduce project
risks in a high-speed railway project.
It is usually believed that taking a conservative
stance can reduce project risks. But the risk reduction is
not automatic, and also sometimes there are heavy costs
involved with being too conservative. The initial design
standards of KTX that were believed to be a superset of
available high-speed railway systems, could accommo-
date all three high-speed railwayway systems. But after
the system selection, designs went through extensive de-
sign review process. Of course, the review called for
some redesigns, and caused project delay. Change of
bridge type from PC-BOX to PC-Beam, and back to PC-
Box demonstrated the importance of sound engineering
codes and standards.
Even with all the issues addressed, there will still
be remaining risks. It is the inherent characteristic nature
of risks. Uncertainty cannot be eliminated by one-time
risk management procedures, rather it should be on-go-
ing efforts. In this sense, having a good Program Man-
ager team and good organization body to constantly
monitor risk items and address them is vital to success-
ful project development. Usually probabilistic risk analy-
sis and management is not very successful with a new
railway project, especially with a system that uses new
technology. Probability can be developed with historical
data, but it is not the case with the first high-speed rail-
way project in the country. Experience with existing rail-
way is helpful, but not sufficient. Social and political risks
are higher with a new railway system compared with the
existing railway project. Major project delay was consis-
tently caused by some social and political reasons, for
example, system procurement, route relocation, and sta-
tion location and type. Therefore it is mandatory to con-
sider combined effects of social and political risks,
engineering risks, and financial risks. In this sense,
totalistic or systematic approaches are strongly advocated,
instead of a partial or piecemeal approach. It will be help-
ful to identify effects of each major decision on project
risk. If one is not careful, it will be very difficult to iso-
late causes of specific risks, and address them. For ex-
ample, the decision to procure only the ‘Core’ system
caused high risks, while conservative design variable low-
ered them. But one can only observe the combined effects
of those decisions. Probabilistic risk assessment using the
Monte Carlo simulation is readily available, and is a good
tool for financial risk assessment. It, however, is not good
enough to address combined effects of political, engineer-
ing, and financial risks. An integrated management scheme
should be developed. More systematic approaches should
be developed and tested for future application.
REFERENCES
1. Flanagan, R, and G. Norman, Risk Management and Construction,
Blackwell Scientific Publications, London. (1993)
2. Lifson, M.W. and E.F. Shaifer, Decision and Risk Analysis for Con-
struction Management, John Wiley & Sons, New York. (1982)
3. Skipp, B.O., Risk and Reliability in Ground Engineering, Proceedings
of the conference organized by the Institution of Civil Engineers,
London, Thomas Telford. (1994)
4. Taylor, J.R., Risk Analysis for Process Plant, Pipelines and Transport,
E &Fn Spon, London (1994)
5. Blockley, D., Engineering Safety, McGraw-Hill, London (1992)
6. Rhyne, W.R, Hazardous Materials Transportation Risk Analysis; Quan-
titative Approaches for Truck and Train, Van Nostrand Reinhold, New
York. (1994)
7. Colombo, A.G. and A. S. de Bustamante, Systems Reliability Assess-
ment, Kluwer Academic Publisher. (1990)
8. Henley, E.J, and H. Kumamoto, Probabilistic Risk Assessment; Reli-
ability Engineering, Design, and Analysis, IEEE Press, New York.
(1992)
9. Smith, V. K, Risk, Uncertainty, and the Valuation of Benefit and Costs,
Vol. 4 of Advances in Applied Micro-Economics, JAI Press, Greenwich.
(1986)
10. Suh, S. and K.J. Kwon, Risk Analysis for Highway Project, “Papers of
Construction Research Institute”, Hanyang University. (1997)
11. Institute for Urban Transportation, Indiana Univ., Financial Manage-
ment for Transit - A Handbook, US DOT, April. (1983)
12. Booz-Allen & Hamilton Inc. Evaluation of Houston’s Turnkey Experi-
ence, US DOT (1994)
13. Abacus Technology. Liability Cost and Risk Analysis Studies. Federal
Transit Association, US DOT. (1996)
14. Touran, A., P.J. Bolster, and S.W. Thayer, Risk Assessment in Fixed
Guideway Transit System Construction, Department of Transporta-
tion, Washington, D.C. (1994)
15. Suh, S., Impact of HSR on the National Transportation System,
Proceeding of the Joint Conference of the Korea Transport Institute,
Korea and INRETS, France, High-Speed Railway and National Devel-
opment for the 21st Century, Seoul, Korea. (1995)
16. Cha, D.D. and S. Suh. Planning for the National High Speed Railway
Network in Korea. in High Speed Ground Transportation Systems I:
Planning and Engineering, Proceedings of the First International
Conference on High Speed Ground Transportation (HSGT) Systems,
Orlando, Florida, October 25-28. (1992)
17. Suh, S., Selection of Optimum Route and Number of Station for the
Seoul-Pusan High Speed Railway System, in High Speed Ground
Transportation Systems I: Planning and Engineering, Proceedings of
the First International Conference on High Speed Ground Transporta-
tion (HSGT) Systems, Orlando, Florida, October 25-28. (1992)
18. The Korea Transport Institute, Revision of the Master Plan for Seoul-
Pusan High Speed Railway, Seoul, Korea (1997)
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
Partial support by the Brain Korea 21 Project (The Ko-
rea Research Foundation, Ministry of Education) is gratefully
acknowledged.
